Alice Hallman försvarar sin doktorsavhandling "Hypocrites, Devil’s Advocates, and Bandwagoneers: Essays on Costly Signaling"
Fredag den 9 juni kl 10:15 försvarar Alice Hallman sin doktorsavhandling Hypocrites, Devil’s Advocates, and Bandwagoneers: Essays on Costly Signaling i Hall 2 på Ekonomikum. Välkommen!
I avhandlingen, som består av tre artiklar, undersöker Alice dynamiken i kostsam signalering i sociala interaktioner och undersöker ämnen som hyckleri, sekventiell röstning och informationsinhämtning. Forskningen ger insikter i hur individer strategiskt navigerar i sociala sammanhang samt belyser implikationerna av olika röstningsmekanismer.
Opponent: Professor Zvika Neeman, Tel Aviv University
- Professor Anna Dreber, Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics
- Associate Professor Philip Millroth, Department of Psychology, Uppsala University
- Associate Professor Per Engström, Department of Economics, Uppsala University
Associate Professor Daniel Spiro, Department of Economics, Uppsala University
Associate Professor Ola Andersson, Department of Economics, Uppsala University
The first chapter explains Hypocrisy as an equilibrium outcome of strategic interactions where society cares about a person's private identity but only observes public actions. When people care about social esteem and the cost of misrepresenting themselves, those with the lowest social standing masquerade as highly respected members of society. Real-world phenomena include pedophile priests, sex-offender feminists, and seemingly busy dispensable office workers.
The second chapter studies the acquisition of costly information in sequential voting. Examples include jurors paying attention during trial and board members evaluating the benefits of some technological investment. This paper is the first to explain why late voters sometimes follow the first voter, commonly known as bandwagoneering, and why they sometimes get to cast the deciding vote. When they do not herd, the second voter acts as a Devil's advocate and purposely vote against the first voter without acquiring information. In a lab experiment, more participants act as Devil's advocates when the cost of information is high, as predicted by the theory.
The third chapter theoretically and empirically shows that a sequential mechanism of information acquisition and voting is better than a simultaneous mechanism for strategic and myopic voters. When voters are strategic, the sequential mechanism acts as a coordination device, maximizing information aggregation while minimizing the total cost of information acquisition. The one exception is when voters are myopic and information is of low cost and low quality, then total welfare is higher under a simultaneous mechanism. A lab experiment confirms the main result: The round payoff is 22 percent higher in the sequential voting treatment than in the simultaneous treatment.