Daniel Bougt disputerar med avhandlingen "A Sequence of Essays on Sequences of Auctions"

Avhandlingen består av fyra uppsatser om sekventiella auktioner. Det är när identiska varor är sålda en efter en i en sekvens av auktioner. Med hjälp av teori, data från fältet och ett laboratorieexperiment undersöker uppsatserna potentiella orsaker till den ”sjunkande prisanomalin” och dessa orsakers konsekvenser för auktionsförrättare. Den ”sjunkande prisanomalin” är det ofta observerade empiriska mönstret att priserna i sekventiella auktioner ofta avtar inom sekvenser.

Opponent är docent Per Hjertstrand, Institutet för näringslivsforskning (IFN) och betygsnämndens ledamöter är professor Per Johansson, Statistiska institutionen, Uppsala universitet, docent Per Engström, Nationalekonomiska institutionen, Uppsala universitet och forskare Andreea Enache, Nationalekonomiska institutionen, Stockholms universitet.

Handledare är docent Ola Andersson, Nationalekonomiska institutionen, Uppsala universitet och professor Oskar Nordström Skans, Nationalekonomiska institutionen, Uppsala universitet.

Abstract (engelska)

Essay I (with Gagan Ghosh and Heng Liu). The existence of declining prices in sequential auctions is a well-documented empirical pattern. Three explanations that can explain the puzzle are bidders being risk averse, loss averse, or ambiguity averse. We use a data set on bids and prices from sequential auctions of train tickets to confirm the existence of declining prices. We further document bidder behavior that is inconsistent with bidders being risk averse or bidders being loss averse.

Essay II (with Gagan Ghosh and Heng Liu). We build on the findings in the first essay by studying a sequential second price auction model with ambiguity averse bidders. The studied mechanism closely resembles the one used to sell the train tickets. We provide an identification result that enables us to estimate the primitives of the model. Using the train ticket bidding data we then recover both the distribution of valuations and bidders' "worst-case'' beliefs. We perform policy experiments using the recovered objects showing that the seller would have lost 18% of the revenues if all ambiguity was removed. On the other hand, the seller would have earned 11% more if the tickets were sold using first price auctions instead of second price auctions. This is in line with our theoretical result.

Essay III (with Ola Andersson and Jim Ingebretsen Carlson). We report findings from a controlled lab experiment on sequential first price auctions that are consistent with the declining price anomaly in sequential auctions. We find that prices are higher in the first than in the second auction both in a Risk treatment, where bidders know the distribution of other bidders' valuations, and in an Ambiguity treatment, where bidders do not know the distribution of other bidders' valuations. 

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